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A B S T R A C T
Older workers who lose their job are at great risk of experiencing long-term unemployment. This vulnerability
can be due to negative selection into unemployment or to age discrimination by employers. We empirically test
three explanations of why older jobseekers may struggle to get reemployed: employers promote internal careers;
employers prefer younger workers for physically demanding jobs; employers perceive older workers as being too
expensive. We test these hypotheses by analysing two experiments in Switzerland. In a factorial survey ex-
periment, 500 recruiters indicated for fictional CVs with ages 35–55 the likelihood of an invitation to a job
interview. In a natural experiment, 1200 workers were surveyed two years after their plant closed down, al-
lowing us to compare age gaps in reemployment among workers displaced by the same exogenous event.
Combining the two experimental methods allows us to increase internal and external validity. Both the factorial
survey among recruiters and the survey among displaced workers show large age barriers in hiring. Unemployed
workers aged 55 are much less likely to be considered for hiring than those aged 35 with the same productive
attributes. This age penalty is larger for blue-collar workers and clerks than upper-level white-collar employees,
throwing doubt on the internal career hypothesis. By contrast, results for earnings are consistent with the ar-
gument that older workers’ reemployment chances are hampered by high wage costs.
1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, governments across Europe have in-
creased the statutory retirement age. Postponing the pension age means
that older workers depend on labour market income for longer periods
of their lives. These policy changes take place against a background
where older jobseekers struggle to find reemployment and face much
longer unemployment spells than younger jobseekers in both Europe
and the US (Farber, Silverman, & Von Wachter, 2017: 169). Such age-
related barriers in hiring seem at odds with government exhortations to
work longer.
At the same time, the unemployment rates of older workers lie
systematically below those of younger age groups across the OECD.
Unemployment among older workers is then defined less by the risk of
becoming unemployed than by the vulnerability of remaining un-
employed for long periods of time (Hornstein & Lubik, 2015: 135).
Unemployment may thus have a heterogeneous effect on age groups,
leaving deeper scars on older than mid-aged and young individuals
(Gangl, 2006).
In recent years, the issue of causal heterogeneity has attracted
growing interest among social stratification researchers (e. g. Brand &
Xie, 2010; Xie, Brand, & Jann, 2012). The idea is that the same
treatment (say, unemployment) affects different population groups
(say, age cohorts) in different ways. At the same time, effects that are
actually homogeneous (and thus do not differ between age groups) may
easily be mistaken as being heterogeneous if unobserved selection has
an influence on both the treatment (such as losing one’s job) and out-
come (such as getting reemployed) (Breen, Choi, & Holm, 2015).
This argument is relevant because unobserved selection into un-
employment is likely to be stronger among older than younger workers.
When young workers enter the labour market, they typically experience
periods of unemployment and job-hopping before finding a good em-
ployer match. Since most new jobs are unstable and of short duration,
spells of unemployment are more common at earlier than later stages of
the work career (Farber, 1999: 16; Hornstein & Lubik, 2015: 135). The
fewer old workers who become unemployed may thus be selected more
negatively. This argument would thus explain older jobseekers’ re-
employment difficulties by their (unobserved) work-related character-
istics rather than by their age.
Yet there are also good reasons to expect a truly heterogeneous
effect of age on reemployment. This is the case if employers hold age-
related stereotypes and avoid hiring older workers because they con-
sider them to be less resistant to stress, less competent in new tech-
nologies, to make higher wage demands or to be less productive overall
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than younger workers (Karpinska, Henkens, & Schippers, 2013).
Our paper analyses the extent and causes of age barriers in hiring –
discrimination against older jobseekers – on the basis of two experi-
ments. We first turn to a factorial survey experiment (also known as
vignette study) where 500 HR professionals indicate the likelihood that
they would invite fictional jobseekers to a job interview. By randomly
varying a set of dimensions in the résumés, we are able to see whether
unemployed workers aged 50 or 55 are less likely to get a job interview
than their colleagues aged 35 or 40. Second, we use mass displacement
as a natural experiment and surveyed 1200 workers two years after
their plant closed down. This survey allows us to compare age differ-
ences in reemployment rates among jobseekers who were made re-
dundant by the same exogenous event.
The two experiments complement each other. The factorial survey
informs us of the demand-side of the labour market – employers and
their ratings – and has strong internal validity. Yet although we tar-
geted actual recruiters rather than undergraduate students or random
individuals, the factorial survey only captures hiring intentions in a
hypothetical setting. For this reason, we combine the vignette study
with a mass displacement survey, which focuses on the supply-side of
the labour market – jobseekers and their reemployment chances – and
reflects real-life behaviour, thus providing us with stronger external
validity.
All our data for the vignette study and mass displacement survey
were collected in Switzerland. Evidence from the United States (Farber
et al., 2017) and the Netherlands (Karpinska, Henkens, & Schippers,
2011) suggests that employers discriminate less against older workers
when the labour market is tight. The Swiss labour market has been
marked by labour shortage over much of the last decades, as is illu-
strated by low unemployment rates and large inflows of work migrants
(Murphy & Oesch, 2018). If labour shortage makes discrimination
costly (Baert, 2018), it should be particularly hard to find evidence for
discrimination in Switzerland.
Our study is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical
hypotheses of why employers may shy away from hiring older jobsee-
kers. Section 3 provides a review of findings on age discrimination in
field, laboratory and natural experiments. Sections 4 and 5 present our
factorial survey experiment, the mass displacement survey and dis-
cusses the institutional context. Section 6 shows the results, revealing in
both datasets a large gap in employment probabilities between young
and older jobseekers. Section 7 summarizes our findings and discusses
their policy implications.
2. Why would employers discriminate against older workers?
The literature on age discrimination highlights the paradox that
while most employers have older workers under employment, they
refrain from newly hiring older workers. Schematically, three sets of
reasons may account for employers’ reluctance to recruit older jobsee-
kers.
First and foremost are worries about job performance and the
widespread expectation that older workers are less productive because
of lower physical strength, health issues, outdated IT-skills, a lack of
fluency in foreign languages or little motivation for further education
(Homrighausen & Wolf, 2018: 3). These beliefs about the characteristics
of individuals in different age groups are widely shared across Western
Europe (Radl, 2012) and thus represent powerful age stereotypes
(Rosen & Jerdee, 1976: 180). Another question is whether they also
amount to discrimination, defined as a situation where jobseekers with
the same productive abilities are treated differently based on their non-
productive characteristics (Büsch, Dahl, & Dittrich, 2009: 41). This
depends on whether age is systematically linked to productivity,
making workers in their mid-fifties less productive than workers in their
mid-thirties.
Overall, the literature suggests that age is a weak indicator of a
jobseeker’s mental and physical abilities and thus a poor predictor of his
or her work performance. A large meta-analysis reports a null re-
lationship between age and ten core dimensions of job performance (Ng
& Feldman, 2008: 403). Similarly, a review of over 100 studies con-
cludes that there is no significant difference in work productivity be-
tween older and younger employees (Warr, 1995: 309). Variance in
work productivity is likely to be much larger within an age category
than between age categories. Nonetheless, an overview article argues
that worker productivity increases during the initial years in the labour
market before stabilizing and often declining towards the end of the
working life. This decline concerns job tasks where speed and en-
durance are important, but not tasks where experience and verbal
abilities matter more (Skirbekk, 2008: 4).
If employers’ reluctance to hire older workers is motivated by
doubts about their physical performance, the age penalty should be
stronger in occupations requiring speed and endurance than in occu-
pations demanding long experience and specialized expertise. Blue-
collar workers such as assemblers and building caretakers stand for the
former, high-level managers and professionals for the latter, the best
example being legislators whose name “senator” (from Latin senex
meaning “old”) suggests a job reserved for elder citizens. This leads us
to formulate a first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1. If employers expect older workers to underperform in tasks
requiring speed and endurance, the age barrier in hiring should be larger in
blue-collar occupations than in occupations held by professionals and
managers, with office clerks in an intermediate position.
Second, the hiring of older workers may contradict the logic of long-
term employment relationships where firms motivate younger workers
to stay on with a deferred compensation scheme based on seniority. In
this setting, the recruitment of older candidates interferes with implicit
promises made to younger employees because it runs contrary to the
policy of primarily promoting internal careers (Daniel & Heywood,
2007: 36-7). Related to this argument is the idea that investing in the
training of new workers may not be profitable if these workers have
only a few more years to go until retirement.
This argument has clear implications for how the age penalty should
vary across occupations. If employers restrain from hiring older workers
because their organization uses long-term incentive schemes and pro-
motes internal careers, the age barrier should be higher for managers
and professionals than office clerks and blue-collar workers who rarely
benefit from internal labour markets. Likewise, investing in the training
of managers and professionals should be more costly than preparing an
office clerk or a blue-collar worker for his or her new job. This leads to
our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. If the age barrier is caused by employers’ concern about
internal careers, the age penalty should be larger for managers and
professionals than office clerks and blue-collar workers who largely
operate outside of internal labour markets.
Third, older jobseekers may face difficulties to find a new job be-
cause they are expected to be too costly in terms of wages. The idea is
that older workers possess valuable experience and expertise, but these
skills come to a large extent with increased firm-tenure and cannot be
transferred easily to another organization. When made redundant, older
workers may therefore lose their firm-specific productivity advantage
relative to younger workers. To the extent that prospective employers
expect older workers to demand wages similar to those earned before
redundancy, older jobseekers may not be hired because their wages
exceed their productivity (Lassus, Lopez, & Roscigno, 2015: 85). Ex-
pressed differently, this hypothesis implies that if displaced older
workers are no more productive than younger workers, but their wages
were higher, older jobseekers will only get reemployed if they accept to
earn substantially less. This expectation is spelled out in our third hy-
pothesis.
Hypothesis 3. If the age barrier in hiring is due to employers’ expectation
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that older workers cost too much relative to their productivity, employers will
not hire older jobseekers unless these latter put up with large wage cuts.
3. Earlier evidence on age discrimination in hiring
Observational studies based on regressions typically find that older
jobseekers face higher entry barriers to the labour market than younger
jobseekers (e.g. Hirsch, Macpherson, & Hardy, 2000). However, un-
employment spells are less frequent among older than younger workers
and thus concern a smaller and possibly more negatively selected
group. This has led social scientists to increasingly challenge the con-
clusions of labour market discrimination based on non-experimental
research (see Neumark, 2018: 800). If older workers with health pro-
blems are made redundant, their struggle to become reemployed may
be due to unobserved characteristics (such as failing health) and not
employers’ preference for younger workers per se. This growing
awareness of unobserved heterogeneity has turned experiments into the
gold standard in research on hiring discrimination, notably field ex-
periments, laboratory experiments and natural experiments.
Field experiments on age discrimination mainly consist of corre-
spondence studies where researchers send applications of fictitious
jobseekers to real employers. These jobseekers are identical in all pro-
ductivity-related features and solely vary in their age. Two review ar-
ticles on correspondence testing find that age discrimination exists in
basically all the countries studied and is sizeable. Notably, age dis-
crimination in call-back rates appears to be larger than discrimination
based on ethnicity, gender or sexual orientation (Baert, Norga, Thuy, &
Van Hecke, 2016: 89; Neumark, 2018). In correspondence studies for
Britain, France, Germany and Spain, call-back rates are consistently
lower for older than younger waiters (Riach, 2015). Likewise, Farber
et al. (2017: 172) show for the United States that unemployed office
clerks in their fifties are significantly less likely to be called back than
those in their thirties and early forties. While there is no difference in
the call-back rates for applicants aged 35–37 and 40–42, the call-back
rate drops markedly for ages 55–58 (Farber et al., 2017: 180).
Most correspondence studies use large entry-level occupations such
as sales assistants or waiters, with office clerks as a common alternative
(see the overview by Baert et al., 2016: 89). The literature finds sub-
stantial age barriers for all these jobs and throws doubt on the argument
that age discrimination is solely due to internal labour markets: Most
waiters and sales assistants do not evolve in internal labour markets
(see Farber et al., 2017; Riach, 2015). Likewise, age discrimination does
not seem to be restricted to occupations with direct customer contact
(Lahey, 2008) and does not vary much between administrative assis-
tants, vendors, security guards or building caretakers (Neumark, Burn,
& Button, 2015: 45). At the same time, none of these studies explicitly
tests differences in age discrimination between occupations.
The most common laboratory experiment uses vignette studies. One
of the earliest vignette studies on age discrimination surveyed 50 stu-
dents and 56 real estate agents in the US and found that 60-year old
workers were rated systematically lower on performance capacity than
30-year old workers (Rosen & Jerdee, 1976). In a replication study,
Weiss and Maurer (2004) found little evidence of age discrimination for
a sample of 204 undergraduate students in the United States. By con-
trast, Büsch et al. (2009) find age discrimination in hiring for a student
sample and a small group of personnel managers in Germany, but not in
Norway. In the Netherlands, several factorial survey experiments ana-
lyse the circumstances in which retired jobseekers are re-hired
(Karpinska et al., 2011; Mulders, van Dalen, Henkens, & Schippers,
2014) or older workers are kept on rather than offered early retirement
(Henkens, van Solinge, & Cozijnsen, 2009; Karpinska et al., 2013).
These studies conclude that, regardless their skill level, workers who
have reached the retirement age are unlikely to be kept on or newly
hired – except in tight job markets. When labour shortage looms large,
the chances of older workers improve.
While basically all the published correspondence studies find age
discrimination (Neumark, 2018), this is not the case for vignette stu-
dies. This discrepancy may be due either to a publication bias against
null results in correspondence studies or to socially desirable answers in
vignette studies. The likelihood of respondents giving socially desirable
answers and denying any form of age discrimination is high if vignette
studies manipulate only one single dimension, namely age – as is the
case in Büsch et al. (2009), Rosen and Jerdee (1976) or Weiss and
Maurer (2004).
A final set of studies uses plant closure as a natural experiment. The
idea is that plant closure represents an exogenous source of variation
where all workers lose their jobs irrespective of their individual per-
formance and productive characteristics. These studies typically find
that displaced older workers face the choice between reemployment
with large earnings losses, involuntary early retirement or long periods
of unemployment – be it in Finland (Jolkkonen, Koistinen, & Kurvinen,
2012), Germany (Knuth & Kalina, 2002), Switzerland (Baumann, 2016)
or the USA (Chan & Stevens, 2001). The same result is shown by a panel
analysis for Germany that compares displaced and non-displaced older
workers over time based on a matching technique (Heisig & Radl,
2017).
In all these countries, the age barrier in reemployment is sub-
stantial. As a case in point, the analysis of the American Displaced
Workers Survey 1994–2016 shows a larger reemployment gap after job
loss between mid-aged (35–44) and older workers (55–64) than be-
tween workers with a college degree and workers having no more than
high-school education. The age gap is 16 percentage points as com-
pared to 12.5 points for the education gap, suggesting that an older age
is a greater handicap for reemployment in the United States than low
levels of education (Farber, 2017: 249).
4. Data and methods
4.1. Factorial survey experiment
Our analysis first examines the extent of and reasons behind age
discrimination with a factorial survey experiment. By combining the
logic of an experiment with that of a social survey, factorial surveys
present four attractive features (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015; McDonald,
2019; Wallander, 2009). First, they enable the researcher to create the
résumés of fictitious job candidates (vignettes) who have the same
productive characteristics and simply differ in terms of age (or gender
or nationality). Second, the random assignment of vignettes to re-
spondents allows the researcher to fully control the information shown
to respondents and thus excludes unobserved characteristics (such as a
jobseeker’s motivation) that affect the outcome variable (such as
hiring). Third, jobseekers’ attributes such as age, gender, nationality or
education vary randomly in each vignette. These ever-changing com-
binations make it hard for respondents to pick out the central dimen-
sion of interest, thus reducing the social desirability bias. This point has
been forcefully shown by Auspurg, Hinz, and Sauer (2017) for the
gender wage gap in Germany: In their factorial survey, respondents
indicated systematically higher wages for male than female profiles.
Finally, factorial surveys raise fewer ethical concerns than correspon-
dence studies, where employers are intentionally misled by fictitious
applications, with possibly disruptive consequences for recruitment and
the running of businesses.
As a drawback, factorial surveys present hypothetical scenarios that
may be seen as unrealistic and elicit little respondent engagement.
Moreover, the ratings of vignettes only reflect the stated intentions of
respondents, which may differ from their effective actions (Pager &
Quillian, 2005). The degree to which stated intentions can be gen-
eralized to the recruitment process is further limited if these intentions
are collected among undergraduate students or the general population.
Our factorial survey tries to address this last issue by targeting real
recruiters. In 2016, we sent a web-based questionnaire to around 4000
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HR managers in Switzerland and obtained responses from 537 in-
dividuals, a response rate of around 13 percent.1 93 percent of all re-
spondents had been actively involved in at least one recruitment over
the last 12 months, the median number of recruitments being ten. Our
analytical sample only includes these active recruiters. They are, on
average, 46 years old and in their majority women (63 per cent female),
disproportionately work in large organizations and mostly answered
the survey in German (70 per cent against 30 percent in French).
Our factorial survey experiment was presented as a study of hiring
practices in different industries and regions for three occupations: ex-
pert accountant, human resources assistant and building caretaker.
These three occupations are common in many organizations and re-
present three hierarchical levels in terms of skill requirements: a high-
skilled professional occupation (ISCO major group 2), a mid-skilled
clerical occupation (ISCO 4) and a low-skilled blue-collar occupation
(ISCO 9). This allows us to test our hypotheses which expect age dis-
crimination to vary across occupations.
Recruiters were asked to indicate for 12 vignettes (4 per occupation)
first the likelihood that they would invite a candidate to a job interview
(on a scale from 0 to 10) and second the monthly wage that seemed
adequate for a given candidate, regardless of the likelihood of a job
interview. All candidates were presented as being unemployed because
their company has closed down. The order in which vignettes were
presented was randomized. Taking out non-responses and using only
active recruiters, we are left with 501 recruiters who provide us with
their ratings for 5290 candidates. These 5290 ratings constitute our
analytical sample.
The profiles of our job candidates – the vignettes – are made up of
11 dimensions, including age, gender, nationality and the type of
education. Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix A present all the vignette
dimensions and levels and show an example of the vignettes. A thorny
issue in experimental studies of age discrimination is the amount of
work experience that different candidates should have. Our factorial
survey mentions for all candidates that they have eight years of work
experience in the occupation for which they applied. Thanks to ran-
domization, all the vignette dimensions such as age, gender, or na-
tionality are uncorrelated to each other (see Table W.1 in the web-ap-
pendix for the correlation matrix).2
4.2. Mass displacement survey
Due to their experimental design, factorial surveys have high in-
ternal validity. However, the extent to which findings can be general-
ized to other contexts is less certain. For this reason, we use a second
dataset of displaced workers who were surveyed about two years after
their plant had closed down. This setting comes close to a natural ex-
periment (Brand, 2015: 361). Plant closure does not completely solve
the issue of selection if the most dynamic workers decipher the writing
on the wall and leave the failing firm before it goes bankrupt. Moreover,
plant closure is more likely to take place in firms and sectors where
technology is obsolete, innovation weak and the workforce dis-
proportionately composed of older workers, as the lack of economic
dynamism reduces the hiring rate (Schwerdt, 2011). However, since all
workers are dismissed independently of job performance, plant closure
reduces the selection bias which arises when firms lay off only their
least productive workers.
Our survey covers the workforces of large manufacturing plants that
employed no less than 150 employees and that closed down in
Switzerland in either 2009 or 2010. Out of a total of ten plants, we
succeeded in getting access to the addresses of the workforce of five
plants. In 2011, we sent a questionnaire to all the valid addresses – 90
per cent of the workforce of the five plants – which left us with 1203
displaced workers, both high- and low-tenured ones. 748 individuals
responded to the mixed-mode survey (77 percent on paper, 21 on in-
ternet and 2 by phone), providing a net response rate of 62 per cent
(Baumann, 2016; Oesch & Baumann, 2015). For both respondents and
non-respondents, the survey data was combined, where possible, with
information from the unemployment insurance register (n = 357) and
the firms’ administrative data (n = 600). The combined dataset pro-
vides us with some information on the post-displacement employment
status for 887 individuals and with complete wage information on the
pre- and post-unemployment job for 387 individuals. The number of
observations partly drops because the unemployed and retired cannot
declare any post-unemployment wages. Table A3 in the Appendix A
shows the descriptive statistics of our analytical sample.
4.3. Estimation method
4.3.1. Factorial survey experiment
Our dependent variable is the likelihood that a jobseeker is invited
to an interview (from 0 to 10) and, in a second step, the wage re-
commendation. Our key independent variable is age, with a fifth each
of our fictitious job candidates being attributed 35, 40, 45, 50 and 55
years. Since job candidates applied for three different occupations,
occupation and the interaction between occupation and age are the two
central control variables. While we also control for gender, nationality,
the type of education and type of work experience, the experimental
set-up means that these variables are all uncorrelated and do not alter
the results.
Our factorial survey has a nested data structure as the same re-
spondent rates up to 12 vignettes. Respondents have different baselines
and are likely to compare (and to anchor) the ratings given to succes-
sive vignettes with the rating given to the first vignette. We thus esti-
mate a respondent fixed-effects regression that eliminates differences in
respondents’ individual baselines and only takes into account the
within-respondent variance (that is, the differences in a respondent’s
ratings of the vignettes shown to him or her). We further correct for the
clustering of observations within respondents by using clustered stan-
dard errors.
4.3.2. Mass displacement survey
Our dependent variable is the employment status at the moment of
the survey, 1.5–2.5 years after displacement and, in a second step, the
change in wages between the pre- and post-unemployment job. For the
employment status, we distinguish four outcomes: employed, un-
employed, inactive and (early) retired. Our key independent variable is
age. We exclude respondents who are younger than 23 (and may be
apprentices and often return to formal education) and older than 62
who have only one (women) or two more years before reaching the
legal retirement age. Respondents aged 23–62 are regrouped into 5-
year categories centred around half decades of age: 25 (23–27), 30
(28–32), 35 (33–37) up to 60 (58–62).
We then estimate multinomial logistic regressions on the employ-
ment status. Results are shown as the age contrast in being unemployed
rather than employed, based on predictive margins. We make sure that
age cohorts are comparable by controlling for gender, a proxy for na-
tionality (four categories), education (six levels) and occupations (nine
ISCO groups).
Finally, we examine differences in age discrimination across occu-
pations by distinguishing three occupational groups that correspond to
three hierarchical levels of skill requirements: (i) upper-level white-
collar employees are high-skilled and include occupations such as
1 The survey was carried out at the University of Lausanne in collaboration
with Patrick McDonald, Fabienne Liechti, Flavia Fossati, Giuliano Bonoli and
Daniel Auer.
2 From the combination of all possible vignettes (5,529,600 unique vignettes
per occupation), we drew an orthogonal (d-efficient) sample of 720 vignettes
per occupation (Auspurg & Hinz, 2015). We implemented a D-efficient design
that uses an algorithm to minimize inter-correlation among vignette dimensions
and interaction terms, while maximizing the variance and balance of the fre-
quency of levels.
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managers, professionals and associate professionals (ISCO major groups
1–3); (ii) office clerks are mid-skilled and mainly made up by admin-
istrative assistants and secretaries (ISCO group 4); (iii) blue-collar
workers are low-skilled and include occupations such as craft and
production workers as well as elementary occupations (ISCO groups
7–9).
At first glance, this occupational variable may seem an overly coarse
measure. However, note that our survey covers the homogeneous
workforces of five industrial production plants. This means that we deal
with the small variety of occupations that exist in manufacturing sites
where the contrast between upper-level white-collar employees, clerks
in the back office and rank-and-file workers in production is highly
salient (and typically enshrined in collective agreements). An added
benefit of this threefold distinction is that it makes the occupational
groups of our two surveys comparable: expert-accountants are upper-
level white collar employees, HR assistants are office clerks and
building caretakers are blue-collar workers.
5. The institutional context of Switzerland
Our study is set in Switzerland, a country traditionally marked by a
tight labour market with low unemployment rates and high levels of
immigration. Switzerland is comparable to Germany in terms of its
occupational labour market and the strong links between firm-based
vocational education and employment. However, employment protec-
tion is weaker, coverage with collective bargaining lower and there is
no legal minimum wage.
Likewise, age discrimination is not explicitly banned by law as in
the United States (with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act) or
the European Union (with the Employment Equality Framework
Directive). Although the Swiss constitution stipulates that “no person
may be discriminated against, in particular on grounds of origin, race,
gender, age”, the federal government has so far refused to introduce an
anti-discrimination law that would address the employment relation-
ship (Sonnet, Olsen, & Manfredi, 2014: 333).
Older workers in Switzerland depend on the labour market for their
livelihood until their sixties. While the legal retirement age is lower
than in other European countries (64 for women and 65 for men), the
welfare state offers few financial incentives to retire early. Combined
with a dynamic labour market, this leads to one of the highest em-
ployment rates among individuals aged 55–64 in the OECD: 72 per cent
in Switzerland as compared to 57 per cent for the European Union and
63 per cent for the United States in 2018.3
However, the nexus between low risks of becoming unemployed and
high risks of remaining unemployed is also observable for older workers
in Switzerland. Fig. 1 shows that the likelihood of having experienced a
spell of unemployment over the last 12 months is much higher for
young workers in their twenties and early thirties than workers in their
forties and, above all, fifties. While this risk exceeds 6 per cent for
workers under 25, it is below 2 per cent for workers aged 55 and more.
Yet if older workers do lose their job, they face much longer un-
employment duration than young jobseekers. While the mean un-
employment spell among workers aged 20–29 lasts less than 160 days,
it exceeds 210 days among workers aged 50–59.
6. Results
6.1. Invitation to a job interview in the factorial survey experiment
We first analyse our vignette study and present the likelihood that
unemployed workers of different ages get invited to a job interview (see
Table 1). Model 1 simply regresses age on the likelihood of getting a job
interview and shows that candidates aged 40 and 45 are no less likely to
get an invitation than the reference category of candidates aged 35
years. However, there is an age penalty for jobseekers aged 50 and,
above all, 55. Candidates who are 50 and 55 years old receive ratings
that are 0.14 and 0.55 points lower than candidates aged 35 (for a
constant of 7.0 points).
Model 2 includes occupations as a control variable. While the size of
the age penalty remains unchanged, this model shows that applications
for the job of building caretaker were rated more favourably than those
for the job of accountant and, above all, HR assistant. The age coeffi-
cients change in model 3 when we additionally introduce an interaction
between age and occupation. For the reference category of caretakers,
the likelihood of being invited to a job interview drops heavily already
at the age of 50. In contrast, accountants do not yet experience any age
penalty when turning 50.
Model 4 introduces a set of socio-demographic controls. These
variables do not change the age effect, but allow us to compare the
effect size for age discrimination with that for discrimination based on
nationality. Being 50 (55) years old decreases the likelihood for a
caretaker to be invited to a job interview by 0.35 (0.54) points – and
thus exceeds, in terms of disadvantage, the ethnic penalty that candi-
dates of Polish and Turkish origin face relative to native Swiss candi-
dates (0.19 or 0.28 points respectively). While it does not help to have a
Polish or Turkish name when applying for a job in Switzerland, it is
even less advantageous to be over 50 years old.
We provide a clearer picture of the age effect in each occupation by
showing the results from model 3 as predictive margins in Fig. 2. It
shows that jobseekers aged 40 or 45 are not rated any differently than
those aged 35 in any occupation. At age 50, there is a hiring penalty for
building caretakers, but not for HR assistants or accountants. However,
at age 55, applications for all three occupations receive significantly
lower ratings than at the reference age of 35. The age penalty at 55 is
largest for the HR assistant (-0.80 points) and smallest for the ac-
countant (-0.36 points).
Finally, we provide a formal test of whether human resources pro-
fessionals perceive age differently for the three occupations by con-
trasting the predictive margins by age and occupation (see Fig. A1 in
the Appendix A). This analysis shows that the age penalty of being 55
rather than 35 is significantly larger among HR assistants than ac-
countants, but does not vary systematically between HR assistants and
caretakers.
6.2. Reemployment rates in the mass displacement survey
We turn to the mass displacement survey and show in Fig. 3 how the
employment status of displaced workers varies by age two years after
plant closure. It is at the age of 35 that the unemployment rate is lowest
(5 per cent) and the employment rate highest (92 per cent). Between
the ages of 40–50, the unemployment rate of displaced workers remains
stable at 12 per cent. It then increases steeply around 55 and, even more
so, around 60, with 28–35 per cent of displaced workers still un-
employed. These are also the ages when early retirement begins to set
in, with a modest proportion of 3 per cent around age 55 and 35 per
cent around age 60 being able to retire early. Fig. 3 shows that eco-
nomic inactivity is of minor importance at all ages for our sample of
displaced workers, never exceeding 4 per cent.
We estimate a multinomial regression model on the likelihood of
different age groups to be unemployed rather than employed, inactive
or retired. Since our focus lies on the contrast between being un-
employed and employed, we translate these logistic coefficients into
predictive margins (see Table W.3 in the web appendix for the full
models). A first model only includes, besides age, a dummy variable for
pre-displacement firm and confirms that the reference age of 35 is as-
sociated with the lowest unemployment risk in our sample of displaced
workers. While age groups in their early twenties and thirties are not
significantly more likely to be unemployed, displaced workers in their
forties have unemployment rates that are 7–8 percentage points higher3 OECD (2019), Employment rate by age group. doi: 10.1787/084f32c7-en.
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Fig. 1. Unemployment incidence and unemployment duration by age in Switzerland.
Data for unemployment incidence: Swiss sample from European Social Survey, rounds 1–8 (2002–16).
Data for unemployment duration: Swiss unemployment register LAMDA, 2004-12 (see Korber & Oesch, 2016).
Table 1
The likelihood to get invited to a job interview depending on a candidate’s age (respondent fixed-effects regression on a scale from 0 to 10).
Dimension Level (Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Age 40 −0.00 −0.01 0.01 0.00
(ref: 35 years) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
45 −0.03 −0.05 −0.01 −0.01
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.13)
50 −0.14* −0.15* −0.34*** −0.36***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13)
55 −0.55*** −0.57*** −0.54*** −0.54***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.13)
Occupation Accountant −0.21** −0.33** −0.35**
(ref: caretaker) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14)
HR assistant −1.10*** −1.04*** −1.04***
(0.10) (0.14) (0.14)
Age#Occupation 40#accountant 0.09 0.10
(ref: 35#caretaker) (0.19) (0.18)
40#HRassist −0.13 −0.12
(0.17) (0.17)
45#accountant 0.01 0.02
(0.18) (0.18)
45#HRassist −0.14 −0.15
(0.18) (0.18)
50#accountant 0.34* 0.36*
(0.19) (0.19)
50#HRassist 0.24 0.25
(0.18) (0.18)
55#accountant 0.18 0.19
(0.18) (0.18)
55#HRassist −0.26 −0.25
(0.19) (0.18)
Nationality Spanish −0.04
(ref: Swiss) (0.06)
Polish −0.19***
(0.06)
Turkish −0.28***
(0.07)
Constant 7.00*** 7.45*** 7.47*** 7.54***
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12)
Additional controls No No No Yes
N vignettes 5,290 5,290 5,290 5,290
N respondents 501 501 501 501
R2 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.10
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Additional controls include gender, type of education and type of experience. For the full model 4 with all controls, see Table W.2 in the web-appendix.
*** p< 0.01.
** p< 0.05.
* p<0.1.
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than those of former colleagues aged 35. However, the real contrast is
with ages 55 and 60 where the likelihood of being unemployed exceeds
that of displaced workers aged 35 by 20–30 percentage points. Adding a
set of socio-demographic controls does not reduce the age differences in
unemployment among displaced workers (see model 2). If anything, the
age differences become somewhat larger (Table 2).
We examine again whether age differences in unemployment vary
by occupation and contrast in Fig. 4 the predictive margins by age and
occupation. These results show that the unemployment risks differ
much more between middle-aged and older clerks as well as between
middle-aged and older blue collar workers than between middle-aged
and older white-collar employees. In other words, the unemployment
rates for ages 55 and 60 relative to 35 are much higher among clerks
and blue-collar workers than among white-collar employees. In our
sample of displaced workers, upper-level white-collar employees are
clearly better insulated against long-term unemployment when they
reach their mid-fifties than clerks and blue-collar workers.
6.3. Variation of wages across age groups
In a last set of analyses, we integrate information on wages in order
to test the expectation that older workers are considered too costly. We
first look at the factorial survey and the wages that recruiters indicated
for each profile if a given candidate were to be employed full-time.
Fig. 5 shows that the wages deemed adequate for a given profile in-
crease with age. Older candidates receive wage recommendations that
Fig. 2. the likelihood to get invited to a job interview by age – relative to candidates aged 35 (predictive margins on a scale from 0 to 10).
The graph shows the predictive margins and 95 % confidence intervals of a respondent fixed-effects regression on the likelihood to get invited for a job interview
(based on model 3).
Fig. 3. employment status two years after mass displacement by age (age at
displacement).
N (observations): 786.
Note: age is measured in age bands (age 25 includes 23–27, age 30 includes
28–32, age 35 includes 33–37 etc.).
Table 2
The likelihood of displaced workers to be unemployed rather than employed
two years after plant closure (predictive margins of multinomial regression on
employment status).
(Model 1) (Model 2)
Age 25 0.07 0.06
(ref: 35 years) (0.06) (0.05)
30 0.05 0.05
(0.05) (0.05)
40 0.08* 0.08**
(0.04) (0.04)
45 0.07* 0.07**
(0.04) (0.03)
50 0.08** 0.09**
(0.04) (0.04)
55 0.21*** 0.22***
(0.05) (0.05)
60 0.30*** 0.34***
(0.04) (0.04)
Socio-demographic controls No Yes
N respondents 776 776
Pseudo R2 0.349 0.423
Standard errors in parentheses.
See note below Fig. 3. Both models control for pre-displacement firm. Addi-
tional controls in model 2 include sex, education, occupation and proxy for
nationality (see Table W.3 in the web-appendix).
*** p< 0.01.
** p<0.05.
* p< 0.1.
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exceed those of candidates aged 35 by 1.8 percent at age 40, 2.6 percent
at 45, 4.3 percent at 50 and 4.5 percent at 55. Translated into annual
earnings, this means that for the same productive attributes, workers
aged 50 and 55 are considered to deserve half a monthly wage more per
year than workers in their mid-thirties – with no systematic differences
across the three occupations (interaction effects are not statistically
significant).
We thus find the seemingly paradoxical result that recruiters value
older workers more highly in terms of the recommended wage, all the
while being less likely to invite them to a job interview. This is con-
sistent with our third hypothesis and the argument that older workers
are sorted out in the hiring process because they are considered too
expensive – and they are considered too expensive because recruiters
expect jobseekers’ going wage to rise with age.
We further examine this hypothesis with the mass displacement
survey and run a regression on change in hourly wages between the pre-
and post-displacement job (see Fig. 6). The reference group of workers
aged 35 succeeded in maintaining, on average, the same level of
earnings. Consistent with ascending early careers, younger individuals
aged around 25–30 even increased their earnings in the post-displace-
ment job. While workers between ages 40 and 50 did not have to accept
wage cuts, this was the case for older workers. Workers aged around 55
and 60 who succeeded to find a new position earned in their post-dis-
placement job between 8 (age 55) and 17 percent (age 60) less than in
their pre-displacement job. Translated in annual earnings, this means
that older workers secured a new job at the cost of receiving one to two
monthly wages less per year. This finding is again consistent with our
third hypothesis that expected employers to be reluctant to hire older
jobseekers – unless these latter are willing to make substantial wage
sacrifices.
7. Discussion and conclusion
Regardless of whether we focus on the factorial survey experiment
among recruiters or on the natural experiment among displaced
workers, we find large age differences in access to jobs in the Swiss
labour market. In the first research design, older jobseekers do not vary
from younger jobseekers in their productive attributes and in the
second design they were laid off by the same exogenous event as their
younger colleagues, namely plant closure.
In both of these quasi-experimental settings, the likelihood to be
invited to a job talk or to be reemployed decreases by age. Our analysis
thus provides support for the argument of heterogeneous age effects of
unemployment. The greater vulnerability of older workers to the con-
sequences of unemployment is not primarily explained by selection.
Both experiments suggest that age in and by itself causally affects the
chances of finding a job for unemployed workers in Switzerland.
Our reference category of 35 coincides with the highpoint of em-
ployability, when workers have acquired 10–15 years of work experi-
ence. There is not much of an age barrier for jobseekers in their late
forties who do not face very different job prospects than those aged 35.
The age penalty surfaces around the age of 50 and then becomes size-
able at ages 55 and 60.
What are the reasons that explain the age penalty in hiring? Our first
hypothesis argued that employers expect older workers to underper-
form in tasks requiring physical skills such as speed and endurance. As a
consequence, the age barrier in hiring should be larger in blue-collar
than white-collar occupations. This expectation is partly borne out by
our data. Both surveys show a larger age penalty for blue-collar workers
than upper-level white-collar employees. However, office clerks are not
in a better position than blue-collar workers, although their job makes
lower demands on physical performance than is the case for blue-collar
workers. Older jobseekers may thus struggle to get reemployed in
Fig. 4. Difference in the likelihood to be unemployed between occupational
groups for a given age (contrast of predictive margins, 95 % confidence inter-
vals).
N (observations): 786.
Note: age is measured in age bands (age 25 includes 23–27, age 30 includes
28–32, age 35 includes 33–37 etc.).
White collar occupations include managers, professionals and technicians
(ISCO1, 2, 3) and blue collar occupations craft workers, machine operators and
elementary occupations (ISCO7, 8, 9).
Fig. 5. Wage recommendation made by recruiters depending on fictional can-
didates’ age.
The graph shows the coefficients and 95 % confidence intervals of a respondent
fixed-effects linear regression on the logarithm of the wage recommendations
for job candidates by age. See Table W.3 in the web-appendix for the regression
table.
Fig. 6. Wage difference in post-unemployment relative to pre-unemployment job.
The graph shows the coefficient and 95 % confidence intervals of a linear re-
gression on change in hourly wages with controls for sex, education, occupation,
proxy for nationality and pre-displacement firm. See Table W.5 in the web-ap-
pendix for the regression table.
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occupations dominated by routine tasks more generally.
Our results allow us to reject our second hypothesis that expected
the age penalty to be rooted in employers’ concern about promoting
internal careers (Daniel & Heywood, 2007). If this were the case, the
age barrier to hiring should be higher among managers and profes-
sionals than office clerks and blue-collar workers. However, blue-collar
workers and office clerks suffer larger age penalties than upper-level
white-collar employees, even though internal labour markets and de-
layed compensation schemes play a subordinate role in their careers.
Upper-level white collar employees seem better shielded from age
discrimination overall: the age penalty sets in later (around 55 rather
than 50) and is smaller.
Finally, our third hypothesis argued that employers expect older
workers to cost too much relative to their productivity. Therefore, re-
cruiters would hire older jobseekers only if they accepted large wage
cuts. Our data provide support for the two underlying assumptions of
this hypothesis. On the demand-side of the labour market, our factorial
survey shows that recruiters indicate higher reference wages for older
than younger jobseekers – even though their productive characteristics
do not vary. On the supply-side of the labour market, our data suggest
that displaced workers in their mid-fifties only find new jobs at the cost
of much lower wages than what they earned in their pre-displacement
job.
Our results allow us to rule out the internal career thesis as the main
mechanism behind the age barrier in hiring. However, other explana-
tions than our two hypotheses on physical demands and wage costs are
also consistent with our findings, notably a taste-based account of
discrimination. If recruiters hold age-based stereotypes and dislike
hiring older workers, these latter may need to compensate their dis-
advantage by offering skills that are in short supply, notably long ex-
perience and specialized expertise. Where these latter skills are crucial,
typically in management and the professions, older workers may stand
a better chance of getting reemployed than in the less specialized po-
sitions on the factory floor and in the back office. Likewise, our finding
that older workers trade in lower wages against the opportunity of
getting a new job could also be explained with taste-based dis-
crimination. The idea is that older workers need to offer large discounts
on their wages to be considered attractive candidates for a job.
While our data do not allow us to quantify the role of stereotypes,
they throw doubt on accounts that primarily emphasize rational
decision-making by human resources departments. One such account is
that older jobseekers are discarded because they have only a limited
number of years to go until retirement – which makes their recruitment
expensive, given the fixed costs created by searching, training and job
vacancies. Both our surveys show a large hiring disadvantage at the age
of 55 when workers have another 9–10 years to go until retirement.
Given that median job tenure is less than seven years in Europe
(Eurofound, 2015: 17) and less than five years in the United States,
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2019) rational recruiters should consider a
horizon of 9–10 years as sufficient to recoup investment. This should
notably be the case in more routine occupations where search costs are
lower and workers expected to hit the ground running such as in pro-
duction work, building caretaking or the back office. Yet our data show
that it is precisely in these occupations that the age handicap is largest.
Finally, our findings raise an uncomfortable question for social
policy. Unemployed workers in their mid-fifties have a much harder
time in the recruitment process than younger candidates. Yet, they have
a decade more to go until they reach the legal retirement age. The
prolonged unemployment at the end of people’s careers not only leads
to much mental suffering and unhappiness (Lassus et al., 2015), but also
points to an unresolved tension in the reform of pension systems. As
long as employers are reluctant to hire older workers, the government
summons to work longer sounds hollow to older jobseekers incapable of
securing new employment.
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Appendix A
Table A1
Fig. A1. Difference in likelihood to get invited to an interview between occupations for a given age (contrast of predictive margins, 95 % confidence intervals).
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Table A1
Variables included in the vignettes of the factorial survey experiment.
Dimension (variable) Levels (values)
Gender* Male, female
Age 35, 40, 45, 50, 55
Children 0, 1, 2, 3
Civil Status Single, married, divorced
Type of education Vocational, general
Type of work Experience Private sector, public sector
Nationality* Swiss, Spanish, Turkish, Polish
Mother tongue German/French
German/French plus an additional language
Participation in active labour market program** None, training program, occupational program (matched and unmatched), subsidy, temporary employment
Channel of Application Advertisement, referral from current employee, unsolicited application, regional employment service
Hobby** None, swim coaching, board member of a Swiss/foreign cultural association, volunteer for Red Cross driving service
* These dimensions were denoted by the names of applicants.
** “None” implies that this dimension did not appear in the vignette.
Table A2
Example of a vignette (translated from French and German).
(continued on next page)
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Table A2 (continued)
Table A3
Mass displacement survey - descriptive statistics of the variables used.
min max mean
Employment status
Gainfully employed 0 1 0.73
Unemployed 0 1 0.18
Early retired 0 1 0.07
Economically inactive 0 1 0.02
Change in post- relative to pre-unemployment wage −0.63 0.67 −0.04
Age at moment of displacement 23 62 46.72
25 (22–27) 0 1 0.06
30 (28–32) 0 1 0.07
35 (33–37) 0 1 0.08
40 (38–42) 0 1 0.12
45 (43–47) 0 1 0.16
50 (48–52) 0 1 0.19
55 (53–57) 0 1 0.13
60 (58–62) 0 1 0.20
Male 0 1 0.83
Nationality (proxy)
Swiss, German, French 0 1 0.70
Italy 0 1 0.08
Spain, Portugal 0 1 0.03
Other 0 1 0.18
Education
Does not know 0 1 0.03
Compulsory education 0 1 0.14
Pre-apprenticeship 0 1 0.03
Upper secondary education 0 1 0.54
Higher vocational education 0 1 0.15
University 0 1 0.11
Occupation (isco-1digit)
Managers (isco1) 0 1 0.09
Professionals (isco2) 0 1 0.05
Technicians and associate professionals (isco3) 0 1 0.20
Clerks (isco4) 0 1 0.08
Craft workers (isco7) 0 1 0.26
Plant operators (isco8) 0 1 0.29
Elementary occupations (isco9) 0 1 0.04
Mass displacement survey 2011. N observations: 776.
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Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rssm.2019.100441.
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